We should not remount all filesystem types since not all filesystems
are safe to remount and some (nfs) return errors if remounted with
certain mount options.
The enable attribute of `boot.initrd.systemd.contents.<name>` was
ignored for building initrd storePaths. This resulted in building
derivations for the initrd even if it was disabled.
Found while testing a to build a nixos system with a kernel without
lodable modules[0]
[0]: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/411792
We currently bypass systemd's switch-root logic by premounting
/sysroot/run. Make sure to propagate its sub-mounts with the recursive
flag, in accordance with the default switch-root logic.
This is required for creds at /run/credentials to survive the transition
from initrd -> host.
I was confused why I could not get an emergency access console despite setting systemd.emergencyMode=true.
Turns out there is another similar option `boot.initrd.systemd.emergencyAccess` that I should have used.
This is confusing and this change should make it more clear vie the docs of both these options.
Containers did not have *systemd-journald-audit.socket* in *additionalUpstreamSystemUnits*, which meant that the unit was not provided.
However the *wantedBy* was added without any additional check, therefore creating an empty unit with just the *WantedBy* on *boot.isContainer* machines.
This caused `systemd-analyze verify` to fail:
```text
systemd-journald-audit.socket: Unit has no Listen setting (ListenStream=, ListenDatagram=, ListenFIFO=, ...). Refusing.
systemd-journald-audit.socket: Cannot add dependency job, ignoring: Unit systemd-journald-audit.socket has a bad unit file setting.
systemd-journald-audit.socket: Cannot add dependency job, ignoring: Unit systemd-journald-audit.socket has a bad unit file setting.
```
The upstream unit already contains the following, which should make it safe to include regardless:
```ini
[Unit]
ConditionSecurity=audit
ConditionCapability=CAP_AUDIT_READ
```
For reference, this popped up in the context of #[360426](https://redirect.github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/issues/360426) as well as #[407696](https://redirect.github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/407696).
Co-authored-by: Bruce Toll <4109762+tollb@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: benaryorg <binary@benary.org>
This is part of security-in-depth.
No suid binaries or devices should ever be in the nix store.
If they are, something is seriously wrong.
Disallowing this from a file system level should be non-breaking.
